Nyayamrta

Nyayamrta [ Extract from Dvaita Vedanta  by R.K Paramahamsa  Pages 134-137]
In his work Nyayamrta, his magnum opus, Vyasatirtha
undertakes a complete vindication of the philosophical power
and prestige of the realistic metaphysics of Madhva,
Anandatirtha. The first chapter discusses the central idea of
‘idealism’, the unreality of phenomenal world, and refutes the
doctrines of Advaita in all their manifestations. The second
chapter refutes the doctrine of Akhandartha and its application
to Upanisadic texts. He shows that ‘Difference’ is real,
cognizable and characterizable with the help of ‘Visesas’. He
establishes that Madhva’s scheme of five-fold difference has
the sanction and support of the three Pramanas. The chapter
ends with a discourse of the Dvaita view as to the atomicity of
the soul. The third chapter critically examines the place and
significance to be assigned to the scriptural injunctions
regarding the various means of realization such as sravana,
manana, religious instructions, self-discipline, etc in
expediting God-realization. The fourth chapter elucidates the
doctrine of Mukti as understood by Madhva. It maintains that
gradation obtains in Moksa, and must do so in view of certain
logical necessities and scriptural admissions.
In this work, Vyasatirtha details various topics to
refute dialectically the interpretations of Advaita. He expands
on the works of Jayatirtha and Visnudasa, disputing the
explanations of eminent Advaitins up to his time. He
discusses several doctrines of Advaita Vedanta, not noticed
by his predecessors, particularly Visnudasa, and deals with
new definitions of concepts such as falsity. His contribution to
Madhva thought is thus new and original. He is not only the
founder of the dialectic of the Madhva School, but also the
fountainhead of the entire controversial literature of the
Dvaita-Advaita schools subsequent to him. ‘It is Vyasatirtha,
who, for the first time, took special pains to collect together,
from the vast range of Advaitic literature, all the crucial points

for discussion and arrange them on a novel, yet thoroughly
scientific and systematic plan’.
This work of Vyasatirtha is not a mere summary or
adaptation of the works of his predecessors. It is the most
stimulating philosophical examination of the premises and
conclusions, the basis and superstructures of the Dvaita and
Advaita systems from a dialectical angle, and giving the final
verdict, after due examination, in favour of realistic
metaphysics. It represents the highest achievement of the
dialectical genius of the Madhva School. In the true spirit of a
philosopher, he goes through a long and arduous process of
thought-dissection to show that the thesis of Monism cannot
be proved and that there is no philosophical justification for
rejecting the reality of the world and its experiences
established by all known means of proof and knowledge. This
work is a great contribution to all analytical thinking in
Vedanta and, according to Dasgupta, ‘Vyasatirtha stands
almost unrivalled in the whole field of Indian thought’.
Vyasatirtha begins his Nyayamrta with a demolition of
the foundations of Mityatva, and builds his system of realistic
metaphysics on the firm foundations of the validity of
experience grounded in the verdict of flawless senseperception,
pratyaksa certified by saksi. He adopts a very
rationalistic approach to the problem of philosophy. He
stresses that the world is real in the sense in which the
Brahman is held to be real, in a manner comprehended by the
senses, pratyaksa yogya sattvanirukti, and in terms which
necessarily veto this unreality. He adds that if the reality of the
Brahman is essentially indefinable, so is the case with the
world, too. The Brahman is, indeed, claimed to be somehow
real even though Its reality may not admit of any kind of
logical definition. He argues that there is nothing illogical if
the Dvaitin chooses to regard the world as real by virtue of its
essential and inalienable reality, even though such reality may
not be logically definable. He further adds that if the reality of
the Brahman stands for something more than a distinction
from unreality, or for unconditioned existence, such a

definition is to apply to the world, too. The reality of the world
may be claimed to be revealed by the Saksi-pratyaksa. It is
revealed by the first and primary perception of the Saksi. The
world of perception has a right to be regarded as real by virtue
of the same kind of reality that is attributed to the Brahman,
and conveyed by the expression ‘real’ which, when applied to
it, suffices to repudiate its falsity.
Vyasatirtha expounds the concept of Visesas bridging
the gap between substance and attributes, and bringing them
together into an integrated whole, rationalizing their mutual
relationship. He defines precisely the relation between
substance and attributes in terms of identity-in-difference.
The relation is best known as savisesabheda. The difference
of a thing from another, and from any of its attributes, is
‘colourfully identical’, sa-visesabhinna with it. This basic
identity precludes the possibility of regress of logical relations,
while it recognizes Visesa as a peculiar potency of the thing in
question. It operates as a ‘representative’ of difference and
helps to distinguish the attributes effectively from each other
and from the substance, without prejudice to the integrity of
the whole. As such, it obviates the flaw of synonymy of
expression, paryayatva. Visesa is thus, by definition, a
peculiar characteristic of a thing which enables inseparable
whole to keep intact its richness of content from being lost in
the underlying unity of essence, and preserve variety of
aspects and attributes in their rightful places without
overlapping of any kind, or from usurping or invading each
other’s place or jurisdiction or function. It holds the masterkey
to the mystery of substance and attributes. He analyses
Upanisadic texts such as ‘Vijnanam Anandam Brahma’ to
establish the acceptance of Visesas which help in detecting
difference-in-identity and diversity in unity. Visesa is to be
accepted as a sarvatantra-siddhanta.
Visesas are to be admitted only in cases of proved
identity where, nevertheless, a difference is permitted. It does
not give any right to outlaw all difference, and explain
differentiation everywhere in normal experience, as in respect

of any two objects like a pot and a piece of cloth, on the basis
of Visesas. Visesas are just meant to function as a
representative of difference where actual and absolute
difference is not recognized to exist.
Vyasatirtha handles the concept of Visesas in a
purely philosophical perspective. He, therefore, devotes
considerable attention to the establishment of Saksi as the
highest basis of all pramanas, and the ultimate source and
guarantor of all proof. Sense-perception, as tested by the
saksi, and ratified by it, acquires absolute and infallible
certainty. The reality of human experience such as pleasure
and pain, gradation and diversity, is all grounded upon the
verdict of Saksi and ratified by it. As such it is ipso facto
entitled to the highest validity. He asserts, like Madhva, that,
if any scriptural texts deny the validity of world and human
experience, such texts need reinterpretation in accordance
with the verdict of the Saksi, in favour of the reality of the
world experience. It is for this reason that Madhva and his
commentators emphasize the primacy of pratyaksa over other
means of proof, and the supreme significance of saksipratyaksa
as a support of all other pramanas, upajivya. They
are ardent champions of the view of the philosophical Realism
that our senses are essentially capable of, and competent to,
revealing objective reality as it is, and are not merely
appearance-interpreting.
Vyasatirtha argues that experience shows that the
jivas are limited creatures differing immeasurably from the
universal consciousness of the Brahman. The Brahman is
established by Scripture as an omniscient, all-powerful Being.
There is an insurmountable barrier in the proposition of
identity between them. The very proof of their existence is the
proof of their being endowed with such mutually incompatible
attributes. In the face of such odds, the proposition of identity
between the Brahman and the jiva is not acceptable.